Virginia Limits the Assignability of LLC Member Control Rights
The transferability of an LLC member’s interest is determined by the terms of the LLC’s operating agreement and the requirements of the state’s LLC Act. State LLC statutes usually distinguish between transferability of a member’s economic interest and the member’s control rights, and generally make it easier to transfer the economic rights than the right to participate in management.
The Virginia Supreme Court recently analyzed the interplay between the transferability provisions of Virginia’s LLC Act and the LLC’s operating agreement in Ott v. Monroe, No. 101278, 2011 Va. LEXIS 214 (Va. Nov. 4, 2011). The court held that the death of an LLC member, and the transfer by will of his interest in the LLC, resulted in the transfer of the decedent’s economic rights but not his management rights.
Dewey Monroe, Jr. was an 80% member of L&J Holdings, LLC, a Virginia limited liability company. His wife Lou Ann was a 20% managing member. Dewey died in 2004, and his will bequeathed his LLC interest to his daughter Janet. Janet later called a meeting of the LLC and voted her 80% to remove Lou Ann and substitute herself as the managing member. Lou Ann objected that Janet had inherited only Dewey’s right to share in the LLC’s profits, losses, and distributions, and therefore had no right to vote as a member.
Janet then filed suit and asked for a declaration that she had inherited Dewey’s full membership in the LLC and that Lou Ann had been validly removed as a managing member. The trial court found that Janet had inherited only the economic rights and had no right to vote her interest or participate in the control of the LLC’s affairs, and that Janet therefore had no authority to remove Lou Ann from her position.
Virginia’s Supreme Court reviewed the history of Virginia’s LLC Act, and found the transferability of a member’s LLC interest to be analogous to the transferability of a partner’s interest in a partnership. Id. at *5-6. The Virginia Partnership Act recognizes that a partner’s interest comprises two components: a control interest and a financial or economic interest, and the court found this same division to be inherent in the LLC Act:
Unless otherwise provided in the articles of organization or an operating agreement, a membership interest in a limited liability company is assignable in whole or in part. An assignment of an interest in a limited liability company does not of itself dissolve the limited liability company. An assignment does not entitle the assignee to participate in the management and affairs of the limited liability company or to become or to exercise any rights of a member. Such an assignment entitles the assignee to receive, to the extent assigned, only any share of profits and losses and distributions to which the assignor would be entitled.
Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-1039(A). The Act goes on to provide a way for an assignee to become a member: “Except as otherwise provided in writing in the articles of organization or an operating agreement, an assignee of an interest in a limited liability company may become a member only by the consent of” a majority of those members or member-managers. Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-1040(A).
The trial court had concluded that Dewey’s death resulted in his dissociation under Section 13.1-1040.1(7) (an individual member is dissociated upon his or her death), and that therefore his rights to participate in the LLC’s management terminated and only the economic rights survived to be inherited by Janet.
Janet argued that Section 2 of the LLC’s operating agreement, which permitted her to inherit Dewey’s rights, superseded Section 13.1-1040.1(7)(a) and that therefore Dewey was not dissociated. Section 2 of the operating agreement said:
[e]xcept as provided herein, no Member shall transfer his membership or ownership, or any portion or interest thereof, to any non-Member person, without the written consent of all other Members, except by death, intestacy, devise, or otherwise by operation of law.
Ott, 2011 Va. LEXIS 214, at *1-2. But the court did not detect any intent in the operating agreement to supersede Section 13.1-1040.1(7)(a), pointing out that Section 2 of the agreement does not explicitly address statutory dissociation.
The court concluded: “Dewey thus was dissociated from the Company upon his death and Janet became a mere assignee by operation of Code § 13.1-1040.2, entitled under Code § 13.1-1039 only to his financial interest.” Id. at *10. The result was that Janet inherited the economic rights but was not admitted as a member, and therefore had no ability to vote her interest or otherwise participate in management. The court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Janet’s claims to management rights.
Not content to resolve the dispute before it, the court went further and opined that “it is not possible for a member unilaterally to alienate his personal control interest in a limited liability company. Code § 13.1-1039(A).” Id. The court pointed out that the phrase “[u]nless otherwise provided in the articles of organization or an operating agreement” modifies only the first sentence of Section 13.1-1039(A), and not the third sentence, which says: “An assignment does not entitle the assignee to participate in the management and affairs of the limited liability company or to become or to exercise any rights of a member.” (The entirety of Section 13.1-1039(A) is quoted above.) The court concluded that the operating agreement could not confer the power on Dewey to unilaterally convey to Janet his control interest. Ott, 2011 Va. LEXIS 214, at *11.
The court ignored Section 13.1-1040, however. That Section states that, except as provided in the LLC’s articles of organization or operating agreement, an assignee may become a member only by the consent of a majority of the members or managing members. This allows the operating agreement to limit or expand how an assignee can become a member. For example, the operating agreement could say that no consent of any member is required for an assignee (or certain classes of assignees) to become a member, and that any such assignee becomes a voting member upon the effectiveness of the assignment. This counterexample shows the risk in a court giving opinions beyond the dispute immediately before it.
The court also ignored Section 13.1-1001.1(C), which states: “This chapter shall be construed in furtherance of the policies of giving maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and of enforcing operating agreements.” That’s surprising, given its direct relevance to the court’s task of interpreting the Act’s strictures on the LLC’s operating agreement.
Absent a Written Operating Agreement, Withdrawing Member of Kentucky LLC Has No Claim for Value of His Interest
The lawyers’ maxim is, “get it in writing.” Oral agreements can be difficult to prove and often leave unanswered questions. In Chapman v. Regional Radiology Associates, PLLC, 2011 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 251 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2011), the members had no written agreement and not much of an oral agreement. One of the two members withdrew and they couldn’t agree on what the withdrawing LLC member was entitled to.
Background. Dr. Shiben organized Regional Radiology Associates, PLLC in 2000 and was its sole manager and member. In 2001 Dr. Chapman became employed by the LLC, and in 2002 negotiated with Shiben to become a 40% member and tendered a $10,000 check for his initial capital contribution. The check was never cashed and the doctors never executed a written agreement. Nonetheless, on January 1, 2003 the LLC began treating Chapman as a member of the LLC, and did so through the end of 2005. Profits were allocated 40% to Chapman, distributions were made accordingly, and the LLC’s tax returns showed Chapman as a 40% member.
In January 2006 Chapman gave notice that he intended to terminate his employment, and on April 14, 2006 he ceased working for the LLC. Chapman received his salary through the end of his employment, but he also asked for additional cash for his member interest in the LLC.
Trial Court. The trial court awarded Chapman $20,709 for the LLC’s net income allocated to him through April 2006. Chapman didn’t dispute that amount, but he claimed he was also entitled to receive 40% of the value of the LLC as of April 14, 2006. Chapman, 2011 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 251, at *8.
Neither party contested that Chapman was a member of the LLC from January 1, 2003 until April 14, 2006. The Court of Appeals therefore looked to Kentucky’s LLC Act: “Next, we will consider whether under KRS Chapter 275 Dr. Chapman was entitled to any additional payment upon his voluntary withdrawal from RRA.” Chapman, 2011 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 251, at *11-12.
Termination of Employment vs. Member Withdrawal. The court never discussed the difference between termination of a member’s employment by the LLC and the member’s withdrawal as an LLC member. The court simply treated the termination of Chapman’s employment as being equivalent to his withdrawal as a member of the LLC.
Employment and LLC membership are two different statuses. In general one need not be employed by an LLC to be a member of the LLC. It may be that both members implicitly agreed that Chapman’s employment termination constituted a withdrawal as a member from the LLC, but it is puzzling that the court did not address the issue.
Dissociation. After reviewing Sections 275.210 (distributions) and 275.205 (allocations of profits and losses), the court found that Chapman was a member of the LLC from 2003 until April 2006. The court then found that Chapman withdrew from the LLC pursuant to Section 275.280 (Cessation of Membership), as it was then in effect:
(1) A person shall disassociate from the limited liability company and cease to be a member of a limited liability company upon the occurrence of one (1) or more of the following events;
(a) Subject to the provisions of subsection (3) of this section, the member withdraws by voluntary act from the limited liability company[.]
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 275.280.
According to the court, “[t]he statute, however, gives no instruction as to compensation for the withdrawing member.” Chapman, 2011 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 251, at *17. After discussing the manager’s authority under Section 275.165(2), the court concluded that the LLC’s manager had the authority to decide how much the LLC should pay Chapman upon his withdrawal from the LLC. The court found the default rules for allocations of profit and loss under Section 275.205 to be inapplicable to a withdrawing member.
Holding. The court held that Chapman failed to demonstrate that the LLC had a legal obligation to pay him anything for his member interest upon his withdrawal from the LLC. No written agreement ever governed his membership, and no provision of the LLC Act required that he be paid anything for his member interest. Chapman, 2011 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 251, at *20.
Mistaken Analysis. The court’s analysis reflects a fundamental misreading of the Kentucky LLC Act. The court without discussion treated Chapman’s withdrawal as equivalent to giving up his economic rights as a member. But the Act clearly recognizes that one may be a non-member while still holding the economic rights of a member. For example, when a member assigns its member interest, the assignee receives only the right to receive distributions and may not participate in management of the LLC unless a majority in interest of the members consent. Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 275.255(1), 275.265(1). The assigning member remains a member unless removed by a vote of the other members, notwithstanding that the assignor has no remaining economic rights. Id. These sections of the Act imply that a withdrawing member still has the right to receive distributions.
This point is made even more clearly by Section 275.265(5): “Unless otherwise set forth in the operating agreement, a successor in interest to a member who is disassociated from the limited liability company shall have the rights and obligations of an assignee with respect to the member’s interest.” The court determined that Chapman’s withdrawal was a disassociation under Section 275.280(1)(a). But under Section 275.265(2), any successor in interest to a disassociated member is an assignee and retains the economic rights of the disassociated member. And if a successor in interest to a disassociated member has the former member’s economic rights, certainly the disassociated member retains those economic rights when there is no successor.
Because the statute provides for Chapman’s continued ownership of the economic rights, he would be entitled to ongoing distributions under Section 275.210. Since there was no written operating agreement, this Section requires the members to share in distributions on the basis of the agreed value of their contributions as shown in the records of the LLC. The tax returns and the records of the LLC for 2003 through 2005 showed that the agreed value of the members’ contributions were in the ratio of 40% for Chapman to 60% for Shiben.
There was apparently no agreement between the parties that entitled Chapman to payment for his economic interest in the LLC upon his withdrawal as a member, but the court’s analysis failed to recognize that Chapman had an ongoing right to receive distributions of $40 for every $60 of distributions made to Shiben.
Bankruptcy Panel Enforces LLC Agreement's Prohibition on Bankruptcy Filing
A Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) of the Tenth Circuit recently upheld a bankruptcy court’s dismissal of an LLC’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition on the ground that the LLC’s operating agreement barred the LLC from filing for bankruptcy. DB Capital Holdings, LLC v. Aspen HH Ventures, LLC (In re DB Capital Holdings, LLC), No. CO-10-046, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 4176 (B.A.P. 10th Cir., Dec. 6, 2010). Bankruptcy law has long refused to enforce contractual prohibitions on voluntary bankruptcy filings, so this case appears to be a chink in that rule.
DB Capital Holdings, LLC was a Colorado condominium developer whose project was 14 months late and $4 million over its $82 million budget. It had no funds to continue the project and was both insolvent and in breach of its loan agreements with its principal lender. At the lender’s request, a receiver was appointed by a Colorado state court to take charge of and protect the LLC’s project.
The LLC’s two members were in disagreement over the receivership, and the LLC’s sole manager then filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition on behalf of the LLC. At that point one of the members filed a motion to dismiss the Chapter 11 case, claiming that the manager lacked authority because the LLC’s operating agreement barred its bankruptcy filing. The operating agreement stated:
The Company (v) to extent permitted under applicable Law, will not institute proceedings to be adjudicated bankrupt or insolvent; or consent to the institution of bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings against it; or file a petition seeking, or consent to, reorganization or relief under any applicable federal or state law relating to bankruptcy ….
Id. at *9 (ellipsis in original). The bankruptcy court held that the LLC’s operating agreement precluded the manager from filing for bankruptcy on the LLC’s behalf and dismissed the Chapter 11 proceeding.
The BAP began its analysis by noting that “[a] bankruptcy case filed on behalf of an entity without authority under state law to act for that entity is improper and must be dismissed,” and that bankruptcy courts must look to state law to resolve authority issues. Id. at *7. Under the Colorado LLC Act, an LLC’s operating agreement governs the rights and duties of an LLC’s members and managers. Id. The operating agreement language was clear; it expressly barred the LLC from filing a bankruptcy petition.
The manager contended that the operating agreement’s ban on filing a petition was invalid because it had been executed at the creditor’s request and only benefited the creditor. The manager cited numerous cases holding that contractual prohibitions on filing for bankruptcy are unenforceable.
The court distinguished those cases as involving debtor agreements with third parties. “Debtor has not cited any cases standing for the proposition that members of an LLC cannot agree among themselves not to file bankruptcy, and that if they do, such agreement is void as against public policy, nor has the court located any.” Id. at *10. The court found the express restriction on the filing of a bankruptcy petition to be enforceable.
The court also reviewed provisions of the LLC’s operating agreement that required the manager to carry out the LLC’s business “as presently conducted,” and that barred the manger from doing any act that would make it impossible to carry on the ordinary business of the LLC. The court concluded that even without the operating agreement’s express prohibition on filing a petition, the provisions relating to the ordinary business of the LLC, as presently conducted, prohibited the manager from filing a bankruptcy petition.
Although the court upheld the operating agreement’s express bar on any bankruptcy filing by the LLC, it qualified its opinion in a way that introduced some uncertainty about the scope of its opinion:
In addition, Debtor does not point to any record evidence that the May amendment was coerced by a creditor. For that reason, the Court declines to opine whether, under the right set of facts, an LLC’s operating agreement containing terms coerced by a creditor would be unenforceable.
Id. at *10. It’s the word “coerced” that makes one blink. Normally the only reason an LLC agreement would include a prohibition on bankruptcy filings would be that a creditor or some other third party requested it. If “coerced” means that the limitation was put in the LLC agreement at the request of a creditor, this case won’t have much impact.
“Coerced” usually means some undue pressure or threat. Often some element of physical force is involved, which presumably was not the court’s meaning. Is the LLC coerced if a lender offers a loan on terms that require the LLC to include the restriction in its operating agreement? Most lawyers would probably say no, that’s not coercion. Perhaps the court had in mind the type of situation where a company is desperate for a loan and lacks bargaining power.
Assume the bankruptcy courts will generally enforce these restrictions, as the BAP did this case. Can a lender rely on such a restriction in an LLC’s operating agreement? Not standing alone – the operating agreement is an agreement between members, so the members can change their agreement and eliminate the restriction. For the lender to rely on the restriction the lender would need a way to limit the members’ ability to amend the agreement. For example, the lender could be a member or have a representative that would serve as a member, and vote against elimination of the restriction.
A better way, at least if the debtor is a Delaware LLC, may be to rely on Section 18-101(7) of the Delaware LLC Act. That section states: “A limited liability company agreement may provide rights to any person, including a person who is not a party to the limited liability company agreement, to the extent set forth therein.” A Delaware LLC agreement could provide that it could not be amended without the consent of a named third party, such as the lender.
Capital Calls and Personal Liability in Kentucky
LLC agreements sometimes require members to contribute additional capital upon demand of the LLC. This is risky business for the members. The LLC may unexpectedly ask for more capital when the members are not expecting it. And worse, sometimes creditors will attempt to force the LLC to call for capital from the members, in order to satisfy the creditor’s claim.
In just such a case, the Kentucky Supreme Court last month overruled the trial court and the Court of Appeals, holding that the creditor could not force the members to contribute capital to the LLC to cover the creditor’s claim. The members of the LLC had agreed in its operating agreement to contribute additional capital on the call of the LCC’s manager:
“The Investor Members . . . shall be obligated to contribute to the capital of the Company, on a prorata basis in accordance with their respective Percentage Interests, such amounts as may be reasonably deemed advisable by the Manager from time to time in order to pay operating, administrative, or other business expenses of the Company which have been incurred, or which the Manager reasonably anticipates will be incurred, by the Company.”
Racing Inv. Fund 2000, LLC v. Clay Ward Agency, Inc., No. 2009-SC-000007-DG, 2010 Ky. LEXIS 180, at *12 (Ky. Aug. 26, 2010).
Subsequent litigation resulted in a judgment against Racing Investment Fund 2000, LLC (Racing Fund) for unpaid insurance premiums. The LLC partly paid the judgment by tendering its remaining assets to Clay Ward, the judgment creditor. Not satisfied with part payment, Clay Ward contended that the operating agreement’s provision for additional capital calls provided a way for Racing Fund to obtain funds to satisfy the judgment, and that the court should order the LLC to make the call. The trial court agreed and ordered Racing Fund to call for additional capital from the members to satisfy the judgment. The LLC was held in contempt of court when it failed to comply with the court’s order. Id. at *4.
The Kentucky Supreme Court viewed the unpaid insurance premiums, which were the basis of the judgment against the LLC, as a legitimate business expense. The court also recognized that under the operating agreement the manager could have made a capital call against the members to fund payment of the judgment. But the court declined to order the LLC to make the capital call, saying that the capital call provision in Racing Fund’s operating agreement “is not a post-judgment collection device by which any legitimate business debt of the LLC can be transferred to individual members by a court-ordered capital call.” Id. at *17.
The court’s refusal to order a capital call turned on the limited liability provision of Kentucky’s LLC Act, which is emphatic: “no member, manager, employee, or agent of a limited liability company … shall be personally liable by reason of being a member [or] manager … under a judgment, decree, or order of a court, agency, or tribunal of any type, or in any other manner … for a debt, obligation, or liability of the [LLC], whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise.” Ky. Rev. Stat. § 275.150(1). The court described the limited liability of LLC members and managers as the “centerpiece” of an LLC. Racing Inv. Fund, 2010 Ky. LEXIS 180 at *5.
Clay Ward contended that the operating agreement’s capital call provision should be applied to Racing Fund’s debt on the judgment, and that the court should order the capital call to satisfy the judgment. But because of the centrality of limited liability in LLCs, the court required that to be enforceable, any assumption by members of personal liability must be stated in unequivocal terms, leaving no room for doubt about the parties’ intent. Id. at *16. The Racing Fund agreement did not meet this standard, said the court. Id.
It is unclear where the court was drawing the line. Was the LLC’s capital call provision inapposite because the manager elected not to make the capital call, because the LLC was defunct and the judgment was therefore not an ongoing expense of the business, or because the court did not interpret “operating, administrative, or other business expenses of the company” to include a judgment against the company (even though the court recognized that the judgment was for an unpaid business expense)? If the LLC’s members had included language covering judgments, even judgments at a time when the LLC was insolvent and defunct, would Clay Ward’s claim still have failed if the manager declined to call for additional capital?
What is clear is that the drafting lessons from this case are legion. Members who agree in advance to subsequent capital calls usually have some expectations about those capital calls. The drafter should reflect those expectations in the agreement.
First, don’t create unlimited member liability for additional capital calls. Use a cap of some sort.
Second, don’t rely on the manager’s judgment. Things change over the life of an LLC; a new manager may come in with a different view of how much additional capital the company requires from its members.
Third, carefully define terms such as “operating, administrative or other business expenses.” For example, say the LLC is hit with a large, uninsured tort claim that resulted from its business operations. Is that an operating or business expense? The agreement should have definitions that would answer such questions.
Fourth, if capital calls are authorized, consider providing that if a member does not satisfy the capital call, the exclusive remedy is some form of economic adjustment to the defaulting member’s LLC interest. Adjustments such as dilution, subordination, or partial forfeiture of a non-contributing member’s interest are expressly validated by some state LLC Acts. E.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 25.15.195(3); Del. Code tit. 6, § 18-502(c).
Fifth, consider adding a “no third-party beneficiary” clause, to make clear that no creditor or other third party has any right to rely on or to enforce any of the provisions of the operating agreement, including any obligation of members to contribute capital. Such a clause could also be considered for the LLC’s certificate of formation, which unlike most LLC agreements is a public document.
Amendment of Operating Agreement by Less Than All Members
LLC operating agreements sometimes need to be amended. Members may come and go, more capital may be necessary, or the timing of distributions may need to be changed, for example. If the agreement is to be amended, normal principles of contract law will require that all the members agree.
Sometimes, however, the members will agree in advance that future amendments will require less than unanimity. For example, an operating agreement might provide: “This Agreement may be amended in any respect by the affirmative vote of Members holding a majority of the Units.” Or a supermajority of two-thirds or 80% might be required. This approach is used to provide flexibility, since otherwise a recalcitrant member holding a small ownership percentage could veto necessary change or demand concessions from the company for approving the change.
In some cases a majority-vote provision like the one quoted will include limits on the majority’s ability to amend, such as a prohibition on changing any member’s interest in profits, losses or distributions, without unanimous approval. But what if no limits are included? Are there any limits on the power of the majority to amend the operating agreement?
The California Court of Appeals held last week that there are limits. Abbey v. Fortune Drive Assocs., LLC, No. A124684, 2010 Cal. App. LEXIS 2860 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2010) (unpublished).
Fortune Drive Associates, LLC was a Delaware limited liability company. Brandon Abbey was a member and held a 3% interest. John Sheputis was a member, held a majority interest and was the sole manager. A dispute over a proposed restructuring of the LLC developed between Sheputis and Abbey, and Sheputis concluded it was in the best interest of the members to involuntarily terminate and buy out Abbey’s interest in the LLC.
The LLC’s operating agreement did not authorize the involuntary buyout of a member’s interest. But the operating agreement did provide that it could be amended by a majority vote of the LLC’s member interests. So, Sheputis prepared an amendment that:
- authorized the termination of a member upon the vote of three-fourths of the LLC’s member interests;
- specified the financial terms of the LLC’s buyout of the terminated member’s interest; and
- required that any dispute over the buyout price or any other matter related to the termination be resolved by binding arbitration.
Prior to the amendment, the operating agreement simply provided that any lawsuit relating to the agreement had to be filed in San Francisco.
With no prior notice to Abbey, Sheputis obtained the consent of all members other than Abbey to the amendment and to Abbey’s termination. Abbey filed a lawsuit, the LLC commenced arbitration over the value of Abbey’s interest in the LLC, and Abbey sought a stay of the arbitration and a declaration that he was not bound by the arbitration clause of the amendment.
The court looked to earlier California law on the enforceability of amendments to bank credit card agreements, including Badie v. Bank of America, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 273 (Cal. Ct. App.1998). Under the prior cases, said the Abbey court, a party with the unilateral right to modify a contract does not have carte blanche to make any kind of change merely by following the prescribed procedure. Abbey, 2010 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2860, at *13. (The court applied California law because the parties agreed that California law applied to the issue of contract interpretation.)
The court determined that for a non-unanimous amendment to be enforceable against a non-consenting member, the general subject of the amendment must have been anticipated when the agreement was entered into. The court found that three distinct constraints applied: (1) the intent of the parties, (2) whether the terms of the agreement were sufficiently definite, and (3) the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
In analyzing the amendment to Fortune Drive’s operating agreement, the court focused primarily on the intent of the parties. The court noted that although the amendment was written in general terms, it was adopted to deal with the specific situation of Abbey’s termination, limited the types of claims Abbey could bring, and restricted the recovery he could receive. The court found that no member could have had that type of amendment in mind when they agreed that a majority of the member interests could amend the agreement.
While the members might have anticipated adopting arbitration in a manner that was not prejudicial to their individual interests, it is inconceivable [that] any member intended to authorize the majority’s adoption of an arbitration provision that would benefit other members at the expense of his or her own interests. Yet that is what the Third Amendment’s arbitration provision would accomplish in any dispute with Abbey.
Abbey, at *19.
The court concluded that this particular amendment was beyond the intent of the parties when they agreed to majority amendments of the operating agreement, and that therefore it would not be enforced. The court said it did not have to reach the questions of whether the amendment violated the members’ fiduciary duties and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Operating agreement provisions that allow amendments by less than all of the members are useful because they allow the LLC to deal with new situations without being held hostage by the demands of a minority member, so long as the necessary majority approves the change. But Abbey shows that there are limits to the kinds of non-unanimous amendment that can be made. An amendment that is targeted at a dispute with a non-consenting member and that significantly disadvantages that member is not likely to be enforceable.
More broadly, amendments that affect all the members in the same way also may be unenforceable if the general subject matter of the amendment was not anticipated when the contract was entered into. That’s a broader constraint, and its limits may be difficult to predict for a particular agreement and amendment.
The Abbey court hung its opinion on the intent of the parties and said it did not have to reach the question of whether the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was violated. The obvious unfairness of the Abbey amendment suggests that analyzing the amendment under the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing would have led to the same result – invalidation of the amendment.
How Not to Draft an Attorneys' Fees Clause
Many LLC operating agreements include a fee-shifting provision, a clause that requires the losing party in litigation between members to pay the prevailing party’s reasonable attorneys’ fees. These fee provisions are usually relegated to the boilerplate sections near the end of the operating agreement, and often don’t get much attention when the agreement is being prepared. A ruling last month from the Idaho Supreme Court shows that if the attorneys’ fees clause is not carefully crafted, it may not work the way the parties intended.
In Henderson v. Henderson Investment Properties, L.L.C., No. 35138, 2010 WL 569890 (Idaho Feb. 19, 2010), the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s award of $21,552 in attorneys’ fees. The LLC in the case was formed by a husband and wife and their son and daughter-in-law to operate a sandwich shop. Acrimony later developed between the generations, and the father brought suit to dissolve the LLC. The Idaho LLC Act allows a court to order dissolution if actual or threatened irreparable harm results either from member deadlock or from illegal, oppressive or fraudulent acts of the controlling members. Idaho Code Ann. § 53-643.
Mr. Henderson alleged both deadlock and illegal, oppressive or fraudulent acts, with resulting irreparable harm. The trial court dismissed the complaint, holding that although there had been a deadlock it had not resulted in actual or threatened irreparable injury, and that there had been no illegal, oppressive or fraudulent acts. The trial court also awarded attorneys’ fees to the son and daughter-in-law, based on this provision in the LLC’s operating agreement:
In any action or proceeding brought to enforce any provision of this Agreement, or where any provision is validly asserted as a defense, the successful party is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees in addition to any other available remedy.
The Supreme Court analyzed that language and reversed the award of attorneys’ fees because it found that the plaintiff did not seek “to enforce any provision of the Agreement,” as required by the clause. The plaintiff instead sought dissolution, which is a statutory remedy.
If the parties had been asked about this clause when they signed their operating agreement, they probably would have interpreted it to mean that in any litigation about their rights and duties as members, the winner would have been entitled to recover its reasonable attorneys’ fees.
This clause did not work that way because it applied only to contractual disputes, i.e., disputes over the terms of the operating agreement. The clause did not apply to any of the rights of members that are defined by the statutory provisions of Idaho’s LLC Act. In this case the dispute was over dissolution, a purely statutory remedy. The irony is that if the operating agreement had simply parroted the language of the statute’s dissolution remedy, Idaho Code Ann. § 53-643, then under the court’s reasoning the defendants would have been entitled to attorneys’ fees.
Many important rights of LLC members, such as sharing of profits, rights to distributions, and rights to certain records of the LLC, are controlled by provisions in Idaho’s LLC Act. The Act allows some of those provisions to be waived or modified in the operating agreement, while others are non-waivable. That approach is typical of other states’ LLC statutes.
Under an attorneys’ fees clause like that in Henderson, and under that court’s reasoning, the right of the winning party to get a judgment for attorneys’ fees will depend on whether the dispute was governed by the LLC statute or by specific terms in the operating agreement. That does not seem like the result most business people would intend when they put an attorneys’ fees clause in their operating agreement.
A better solution, of course, is to use a broader attorneys’ fees clause. One example I’ve seen is:
If a suit, action, arbitration or other proceeding of any nature whatsoever is instituted in connection with any controversy arising out of this Agreement or to interpret or enforce any rights under this Agreement, [the prevailing party may recover.]
The language “any controversy arising out of this Agreement” may be broad enough to cover both contractual and statutory claims, although it is perhaps susceptible to the argument that statutory rights not referred to in the operating agreement do not “arise out of” the agreement.
I've also seen another approach that would have changed the result in Henderson, but it may be too broad for some situations:
In the event that any dispute between the Company and the Members or among the Members should result in litigation, [the prevailing party may recover.]
This language literally applies to “any dispute” between members, which could cover a dispute between members that has nothing to do with the LLC. A more natural interpretation would limit the scope of the clause to member disputes that have something to do with the LLC, i.e., with their status as members of the LLC. But to be safe, something like the following might be best:
If a suit, action, arbitration or other proceeding of any nature whatsoever is instituted in connection with any controversy arising out of this Agreement, or to interpret or enforce any rights under this Agreement or the [name of State] Limited Liability Company Act, [the prevailing party may recover.]
Some LLC operating agreements require that disputes be settled by binding arbitration instead of litigation. A recently-published treatise on drafting operating agreements for Delaware LLCs has a nice treatment of arbitration and attorneys’ fees, among other things. John M. Cunningham & Vernon R. Proctor, Drafting Delaware Limited Liability Company Agreements: Forms and Practice Manual (2009).
In the model operating agreements provided by Cunningham and Proctor, arbitrable matters include “material matters: (1) That arise under or relate to this Agreement or that relate to the LLC…” Cunningham & Proctor, supra, at Form 6.1, § 30.3. Their model agreement then goes on to assign attorneys’ fees to the nonprevailing party:
To the extent that an arbitrator determines that a party to an arbitration has failed to prevail in that arbitration, the arbitrator shall allocate to that party the costs of the arbitration, including reasonable attorneys’ fees and fees payable to the arbitrator.
Cunningham & Proctor, supra, at Form 6.1, § 30.11(c). This approach allows the arbitration to cover any dispute related to the operating agreement or the LLC, and applies the “loser pays” rule to the entire arbitration. This approach would avoid the type of problem dealt with in the Henderson case.
The clause at issue in Henderson, and the court’s ruling, show in microcosm why contract drafting is difficult. The unexpected scenario can rise up to swat the drafter. I’ll wager that when the parties put together their operating agreement in the Henderson case, they paid little or no attention to the exact words of the clause. Before any disputes arose I’m sure they would have said that any dispute directly related to the LLC was intended to be covered by the “loser pays” rule of the clause. But yet it wasn’t.
It was not a case of the language being unclear (although some might argue that); it was primarily a case of the language not reaching far enough in its scope. The Henderson case is an object lesson in vignette form for lawyers who draft contracts. The lesson? Know the underlying law and the context in which you’re drafting, and don’t rely too quickly on language taken from other contracts.
Oregon Clarifies LLC Derivative Suit Requirements
The Oregon Court of Appeals has clarified when and how members of an Oregon LLC can maintain a derivative suit in the name of the LLC. Bernards v. Summit Real Estate Mgmt., 229 Or.App. 357, 213 P.3d 1 (July 1, 2009). Oregon’s LLC Act allows member derivative suits, but the court imposed additional pleading requirements on the complaint. The court also found that a requirement in the LLC’s operating agreement of unanimous member approval before commencing any suit in the name of the LLC was subject to the agreement’s standard of care and to the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.
The plaintiffs (Bernards) were minority members of two member-managed LLCs. Each of the LLCs owned apartment buildings and entered into management contracts with the defendant management company (Summit). Bernards claimed that Summit and one of its officers (McKenna) had embezzled the LLCs’ funds, and demanded that the other members approve lawsuits by the LLCs against Summit and McKenna to recover the funds. (The operating agreements for the LLCs required the unanimous approval of the members to bring legal action in the name of the LLCs.)
The other members refused to approve a lawsuit without giving any reasons for their refusal, even though McKenna had admitted embezzling substantial amounts from the LLCs. Bernards then brought derivative suits against Summit, McKenna and the other members, alleging that the other members had breached their duty to the LLCs by refusing to approve the lawsuits against Summit and McKenna.
Oregon’s LLC Act authorizes derivative proceedings by a member in the name of an LLC. Or. Rev. Stat. § 63.801(1). The statute requires that the complaint allege with particularity either that a demand to file the suit was made of the managers (or members in the case of a member-managed LLC), or why a demand was not made. Or. Rev. Stat. § 63.801(2).
The statute does not explicitly refer to any requirement of wrongdoing by the members that refused to approve the lawsuits. The court nonetheless held that when the members have refused the demand for litigation, the complaint must allege facts showing wrongdoing by the refusing members. Bernards, 229 Or. App. at 364.
The court analogized LLC derivative suits to corporate derivative suits. The court had previously held that Oregon’s almost identical corporate statute required, albeit in a demand-futility case, that the complaint in a shareholder derivative suit plead facts showing wrongful conduct by the directors. The court in Bernards applied the corporate rule, holding that in order to rebut the presumption that the members were exercising their business judgment, the complaint must allege facts showing wrongful conduct by the members.
Section 63.801(2) of Oregon’s LLC Act allows the LLC’s operating agreement to vary the statutory pleading requirements. The court therefore looked to the operating agreements and applied their standard of care as the definition of wrongful conduct—gross negligence, fraud or willful or wanton misconduct.
The other members argued that the operating agreements’ requirement of unanimous member consent trumped the pleading requirements of Or. Rev. Stat. § 63.801(2). The court disagreed and held that the requirement of consent was not equivalent to giving every member the unfettered authority to withhold consent. The right to consent was subject to the express standard of care in the operating agreement and the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. The court noted that the requirement of unanimous member consent meant that the plaintiffs had to allege facts demonstrating that all of the member defendants refused wrongfully. “[I]f even one of them refused to proceed and had a valid business reason for doing so, the LLCs could not bring legal action against McKenna and Summit.” Bernards, 229 Or. App. at 367-68.
The court concluded that the facts alleged by the plaintiffs were not adequate to demonstrate wrongdoing. Yes, there was a clear right to recover the embezzled funds (one defendant had admitted the embezzlement). Yes, the other members refused to sue when a demand was made. Yes, the other members had not provided an explanation for their refusal. Yes, one member had stated that he would not authorize legal action against McKenna and Summit “no matter how much money they had embezzled.” Bernards, 229 Or. App. at 362. But, said the court, it was not alleged, for example, that the members had refused to provide an explanation, or that they had a personal financial interest in McKenna or Summit, or that they were driven by some personal animus against the plaintiffs. The result was that the court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the complaints.
The Bernards opinion is noteworthy not only because it answered an open question under Oregon law, but also because it reasoned by analogy and applied Oregon’s corporate law of derivative actions to LLCs. And the result here was clearly right--why should a minority member be able to sue in the name of the LLC to initiate litigation when the other members have decided that the LLC should abstain, without alleging some facts showing that that there was something wrong with the other members’ decision, such as a conflict of interest? Also noteworthy is that the court applied the business judgment rule, while implicitly recognizing that an LLC’s operating agreement could change the rule for that LLC.
