Kansas Court Broadens Charging Order Against Single-Member LLC
Judgment creditors of LLC members usually have the right under state law to obtain a charging order against a member’s LLC interest. A charging order mandates that any distributions by the LLC that would otherwise be made to the member be paid instead to the creditor. The charging order provides no benefit, though, if no distributions are made to the LLC’s members. And if the judgment debtor is the only member of the LLC, it’s unlikely that he or she will cause the LLC to make distributions, since those would have to go to the creditor.
The U.S. District Court in Kansas recently had to determine the scope of a charging order against a single-member LLC in Meyer v. Christie, No. 07-2230-CM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118590 (D. Kan. Oct. 13, 2011). Although the Kansas LLC Act says a charging order against an LLC member’s interest is the creditor’s exclusive remedy, the court surprisingly found that, in the case of a single-member LLC, the creditor could assert management rights and take control of the LLC.
The relevant facts are straightforward. The plaintiffs obtained a final judgment of about $7 million against the defendants, who had interests in several Kansas LLCs. The plaintiffs asked the judge to issue a charging order against the defendants’ interests in the LLCs, under the authority of Kansas’s LLC Act:
Rights of judgment creditor. On application to a court of competent jurisdiction by any judgment creditor of a member, the court may charge the limited liability company interest of the member with payment of the unsatisfied amount of the judgment with interest. To the extent so charged, the judgment creditor has only the rights of an assignee of the limited liability company interest. This act does not deprive any member of the benefit of any exemption laws applicable to the member’s limited liability company interest. The rights provided by this section to the judgment creditor shall be the sole and exclusive remedy of a judgment creditor with respect to the member’s limited liability company interest.
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 17-76,113 (emphasis added).
A charging order is a limited remedy – the creditor has only the rights of an assignee, i.e., the economic right to receive distributions, and no rights to participate in management. The Kansas statute also provides that the charging order is the exclusive remedy, so the creditor cannot attach or foreclose on the member’s interest and thereby take control. (The charging order provisions of some state LLC Acts are silent on whether the charging order is a creditor’s exclusive remedy. See my discussion of Florida’s Olmstead v. FTC case on charging orders, here.)
The court acknowledged the Kansas LLC Act’s clear statement that the charging order is the only remedy by which a member’s judgment creditor can reach the member’s LLC interest, and discussed the partnership law origins of the LLC charging order. In the case of partnerships, a creditor’s charging order against a partner will not entitle the creditor to participate in the management of the partnership. Meyer, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118590, at *10.
But, said the court, the result is different in the case of an LLC with only one member. That’s because of a specific provision in the Kansas LLC Act:
If the assignor of a limited liability company interest is the only member of the limited liability company at the time of the assignment, the assignee shall have the right to participate in the management of the business and affairs of the limited liability company as a member.
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 17-76,112(f). That paragraph is not in the Act’s section on charging orders, but is part of a long section dealing with assignments of LLC interests.
Without discussion, the court simply assumed that the holder of a charging order not only has the rights of an assignee but actually is an assignee. The court then held that under Section § 17-76,112(f), “the assignee/creditor shall have the right to participate in the management of the business and affairs of the LLC as a member.” Meyer, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118590, at *11. With those rights, the holder of a charging order against an LLC’s sole member can take over the LLC, make distributions to itself, and liquidate the LLC if it so chooses.
The problem with the court’s holding is that the creditor’s rights under a charging order are limited to satisfaction of the debt. Once the judgment debtor’s obligation is satisfied, the charging order is extinguished. An assignment, in contrast, is a permanent transfer of the property rights assigned. The charging order statute accordingly recognizes that the rights of the creditor are limited: “To the extent so charged, the judgment creditor has only the rights of an assignee of the limited liability company interest.” Kan. Stat. Ann. § 17-76,113 (emphasis added). The Meyer court ignored the inherent limitations of charging orders. Its confusion between the limited economic rights granted under a charging order and the full transfer of rights granted under a true assignment led it to the wrong result.
Some states have added provisions to their LLC Acts to clarify this point and avoid a Meyer result. Thomas Rutledge recently blogged about the Meyer case, here, and pointed out that Kentucky has amended its LLC Act to provide that “[a] charging order does not of itself constitute an assignment of the [LLC] interest.” Ky. Rev. Stat. § 275.260(3).
Michigan similarly provides in its LLC Act that a charging order is not an assignment of the member’s interest, and that the holder of a charging order does not become a member of the LLC. Mich. Comp. Laws § 450.4507.
One recent publication that is a useful reference for investigating state LLC charging order laws is Carter G. Bishop, Fifty State Series: LLC Charging Order Statutes , Suffolk University Law School Research Paper No. 10-03 (Oct. 6, 2011) .
LLC Manager Is Personally Liable for LLC's Failure to Pay State Agency, Without Piercing the Veil
The sole manager of a Michigan limited liability company has been held potentially liable for the LLC’s failure to pay assessments due under the Michigan Agricultural Commodities Marketing Act (ACMA). Dep’t of Agric. v. Appletree Mktg., L.L.C., No. 137552, 2010 WL 841173 (Mich. Mar. 10, 2010). The case illustrates that an LLC’s liability shield is not absolute – an LLC manager can be personally liable for some types of nonpayment by the LLC.
The ACMA established the Michigan Apple Committee to carry out marketing programs funded by assessments on apple distributors. Distributors are required to deduct a portion of the purchase prices they pay to apple producers, and to hold the funds in trust and remit them to the Committee. Mich. Comp. Laws § 290.651 et seq.
Appletree Marketing, L.L.C. withheld the required amounts from its payments to apple producers in 2004 and 2005, but failed to remit those amounts to the state. The LLC instead used the funds to pay other debts, and later became insolvent and defunct. The state sued the LLC and Steven Kropf, the LLC’s manager, to recover the unpaid assessments.
The trial court entered judgment against the LLC for the unpaid amounts, but dismissed the state’s claim against Kropf on grounds that the state’s ACMA remedy against the LLC was exclusive. Michigan’s Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ACMA explicitly preserved all other lawful remedies, including claims for common law conversion and statutory conversion. The court then examined the issue of Kropf’s potential personal liability.
Under the ACWA, the funds withheld by the LLC were held intrust for the Committee. When the LLC used those funds for other purposes, it asserted dominion and control over the Committee’s money and therefore committed the tort of conversion.
To decide whether the state could pursue claims for common law and statutory conversion against Kropf, the court looked to existing Michigan law:
Michigan law has long provided that corporate officials may be held personally liable for their individual tortious acts done in the course of business, regardless of whether they were acting for their personal benefit or the corporation’s benefit.
Appletree, 2010 WL 841173, at *7. Corporate officers may be held individually liable when they cause the corporation to act unlawfully. Id.
Kropf participated in the tort by causing the LLC to divert the Committee’s funds to other purposes. Although the prior case law involved officers of corporations, the court applied those cases to the LLC’s manager without discussion, apparently by analogy.
The court made clear that this was not a case of piercing the veil of the LLC. “However, we have never required that a plaintiff pierce the corporate veil in order to hold corporate officials liable for their own tortious misconduct, and thus it is unnecessary to pierce the corporate veil in this case.” Id.
The court concluded that Kropf could be personally liable if the facts established the necessary participation: “There is no question that, if the facts prove either common law or statutory conversion, Kropf can be held personally liable and may not hide behind the corporate form in order to prevent liability for his active participation in the tort.” Id. Because the claim against Kropf had been dismissed on summary judgment, the court remanded the claim against Kropf back to the trial court for further proceedings.
Business people use limited liability companies to shield themselves from personal liability for the companies’ debts and obligations. But the shield is not impenetrable, as Appletree shows.
Normally an LLC manager is not personally liable merely because the manager caused the LLC to breach a contract; breach of contract is not a tort. The contract, however, can establish a relationship where the conduct constituting breach of contract also constitutes a tort.
Assume the parties agree that an LLC will receive property and hold it in trust, or hold it as a bailee. If the LLC misappropriates the property and refuses to return it to the other party, it has probably committed the tort of conversion. Then, the LLC manager who caused the LLC to convert the property will be personally liable for the tort.
Tort remedies can sting. For example, under Michigan’s conversion statute, a person damaged because of another’s theft, embezzlement or conversion may recover three times the amount of actual damages plus costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2919a.
Appletree involved an intentional tort by the LLC, but claims against managers can also occur in negligence cases. Sometimes injured parties claim that an LLC manager’s inadequate supervision and management resulted in the company’s negligent injury to the plaintiff. The law is less clear here, although in many of these cases courts do hold managers liable for acts and omissions related to supervision and management. But that’s a discussion for another day.
Low-Profit LLCs - The Newest Limited Liability Company Structure
This month Illinois became the latest state to pass enabling legislation for low-profit limited liability companies, or L3Cs, joining Vermont, Michigan, Utah and Wyoming. The new Illinois law becomes effective on January 1, 2010. According to the Nonprofit Law Blog several other states are considering adopting L3C laws.
An L3C is a limited liability company whose primary purpose is not to earn a profit but to “significantly further the accomplishment of one or more charitable or educational purposes.” E.g., Ill. Pub. Act 096-0126 (SB 0239). An L3C is not a nonprofit and is not precluded from earning a profit, but income or property appreciation may not be a significant purpose of the company. An L3C is a hybrid, a business entity formed to carry out charitable or educational purposes, and designed to attract philanthropic as well as private investment. In almost all respects other than its purpose, an L3C is treated like any other LLC, including income taxes.
To qualify as an L3C under the state laws, the LLC:
● must significantly further the accomplishment of one or more charitable or educational purposes within the meaning of IRC section 170(c)(2)(B);
● would not have been formed but for the accomplishment of the charitable or educational purposes;
● does not have as a significant purpose the production of income or the appreciation of property, although the fact that the company produces significant income or capital appreciation is not conclusive evidence of a profit motive; and
● does not have as a purpose the accomplishment of any political or legislative purpose.
These state law requirements parallel the Internal Revenue Code requirements for the target of a “program-related investment” by a private foundation. IRC § 4944(c). In addition, each of the five states requires that the name of the L3C contain either the abbreviation “L3C” or the words “Low-Profit Limited Liability Company.”
Vermont was the first state to pass legislation to authorize L3Cs, in April 2008. As of August 20, 2009 there were over 60 L3Cs formed in Vermont. In a little over a year four more states have amended their LLC Acts to authorize L3Cs. Illinois, the latest of the four, is a heavyweight in terms of its industry and commerce. L3Cs are here to stay and are growing in use and in public recognition.
There are two principal reasons why L3Cs are taking off. The first is the hope that L3Cs will attract program-related investments (PRIs) by private foundations. By combining philanthropic investment with private capital, L3Cs can offer the possibility of major social impact.
If an investment by a private foundation meets the Internal Revenue Code’s requirements for a PRI, the investment will count towards the foundation’s annual distribution requirements and will not jeopardize the foundation’s charitable purpose. IRC § 4944(c). PRIs by private foundations are not common occurrences today, in part because of the high transaction costs to the foundation in verifying that the target of the investment will meet the PRI requirements. The promoters of state laws authorizing L3Cs expect that foundations will be more willing to invest in companies organized as L3Cs.
A company’s status as an L3C under state law, however, is not adequate to qualify the L3C for a PRI. And if a private foundation makes an investment with an L3C and the investment turns out not to qualify as a PRI, the foundation can be assessed substantial taxes and penalties. The result is that unless and until the IRS issues guidance about qualifying L3Cs for PRIs, private foundations will likely conclude that they must continue to incur the transaction costs involved in determining the correctness of a specific PRI. Those costs often include expensive private letter ruling requests to the IRS.
These tax issues are well described in Allison Evans, Christine Petrovits & Glenn Walberg, L3C: Will New Business Entity Attract Foundation Investment?, 63 The Exempt Organization Tax Review 457 (2009). It appears that without regulatory guidance from the IRS or changes to the tax laws, private foundations will continue to be reluctant to make program-related investments in LLCs, whether or not they are structured as L3Cs.
Branding is the second reason why L3Cs appear to be attractive for companies with social missions. By being labeled as an L3C, companies send a signal to their customers, employees, vendors and communities that they have a charitable or educational purpose, even though they are not a nonprofit. The L3C movement appears to have tapped into this vein of entrepreneurial desire to provide public benefit.
We can expect continued growth in the number of states that authorize L3Cs and in the number of L3Cs being formed. That should increase the pressure for the IRS and federal regulators to come up with a more economically efficient way for L3Cs to qualify for program-related investments, so that private foundations will not be deterred from making investments in L3Cs compatible with the foundation’s mission.
